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50 percent of the acreage so designated is to be without restrictions
on haying and grazing except that acreage devoted to perennial
cover on which cost share assistance has been provided is not to be
credited toward the producer's resource–conserving crop
requirement.
Barley, oats or wheat planted as part of a resource conserving
crop on reduced acreage may not be harvested in kernel form.
Farm program payments are not to be reduced as a result of plant-
ing a resource-conserving crop as part of a resource-conserving
crop rotation on payment acres.  The term "resource conserving
crop" includes legumes, legume-grass mixtures, legume-small
grain mixtures, legume-grass-small grain mixtures and alternative
crops.  The term "alternative crops" means experimental and
industrial crops grown in arid and semi-arid regions that conserve
soil and water.
Program payments are not to be made if the producer hays or
grazes the acreage during the 5-month period during which haying
and grazing is not allowed or, if the crop includes small grain,
before the producer harvests the small grain in kernel form.
The Secretary has the authority to make adjustments in the
crop acreage base to reflect resource-conserving crop rotation
practices maintained prior to participation in the program.
Producers enrolled in a resource-conserving crop rotation are not to
be ineligible to receive payment for program crops on acreage
equal to the average number of traditionally underplanted acres for
the three years before enrolling in the program.
Resource Conservation and Development Program
(Sec. 1452) .  The RC&D program is reauthorized through
1995.  The number of acres is increased to 450.
Management of undesirable plants on federal lands
(Sec. 1453).  The legislation amends the Noxious Weed Act of
1974.  The authority is to be used to control the spread of undesir-
able plants as a result of transporting seeds or commodities to or
from federal lands.
Farmland Protection (Sec. 1464 et seq).  Federal
departments and agencies are to use USDA-developed criteria to
identify the actual quantity of farmland converted by federal
programs.  Under a new "Agricultural Resource Conservation
Demonstration Program," the state of Vermont (and other states
that operate or administer a land preservation fund on or before
August 1, 1991) can qualify for special 10-year subsidized loans
with no principal due during the 10 years.
Administration of environmental programs (Sec .
1470 et seq).  The legislation establishes an Office of
Environmental Quality in USDA and creates an Agriculture
Environmental Quality Council to be chaired by the Secretary or
designee.
Pesticide recordkeeping (Sec. 1491 et seq).  Certified
applicators of restricted use pesticides are required to maintain
records comparable to records maintained by commercial applica-
tors of pesticides in each state even if the state does not require the
maintenance of records.  A commercial certified applicator is to
provide, within 30 days of a pesticide application, a copy of
records maintained to the person for whom the application was
provided.  Records maintained are to be made available to any
federal or state agency dealing with pesticide use or any health or
environmental issue related to the use of pesticides.  The Confer-
ence report states—
"The Managers intend that access to records maintained by certified
applicators in accordance with this section be managed in a manner
that will minimize the burden which is placed upon individual
producers.  In order to do so, the Managers have adopted language
that would make Federal agency access to individual applicator or
producer records the responsibility of the Department of Agriculture
or its designee.  In this way, USDA personnel or the personnel of
the agency designated by the Secretary, would be the only Federal
agency that need contact individual producers.  However, the
records obtained in this manner would be made available through
USDA or the designated lead agency, to other Federal agencies for
use in statistical analysis and for other purposes.  Similarly, a
single State lead agency would be identified to contact producers to
obtain records on behalf of other state agencies.  Both the Federal
and State lead agency would be expected to respond to the requests
of other agencies for access to such records and data in a timely and
complete manner."
Upon the request of a health care professional who determines
that information maintained on records is necessary to provide
medical treatment, record and available label information is to be
provided to that health care professional.
Violations are punishable by a fine of not more than $500 for
the first offense and, for subsequent offenses, not less than $1,000
for each violation.  The fine may be less if the person had made a
good faith effort to comply with the requirements.
For pesticides registered for "a minor agricultural use," special
rules apply under FIFRA.  A registrant under FIFRA may, at any
time,  request that a pesticide registration of the registrant be
canceled or amended to terminate one or more pesticide uses.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
BANKING
DUTY TO BORROWERS.  The plaintiffs had borrowed
substantial sums from the defendant bank for operating the plain-
tiffs' farm and ranch.  After the downturn in the rural economy,
the plaintiffs encountered financial difficulty and negotiated with
the bank for additional loans to cover a pending default on loans
secured by the farm land.  Although a temporary agreement for a
letter of credit was obtained, the plaintiffs eventually had to
liquidate all property in satisfaction of the indebtedness.  The
plaintiffs filed this action alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach
of contract, breach of good faith in contract and in tort, fraud,
deceit and promissory estoppel.  The court denied the plaintiffs'
fiduciary duty claim because the plaintiffs were experienced
farmers and the bank did not exercise control over the operations
of the farm other than reasonable requirements for financial
records.  The plaintiffs alleged that the bank breached a contract to
purchase some of the land and lease it back to the plaintiffs.  The
court held that the plaintiff had insufficient evidence of this
contract and gave no consideration to support the contract.  The
court declined to recognize an action in tort for breach of good
faith because the plaintiffs' right were already protected by other
remedies in contract and tort.  The court also held against the
plaintiffs in the other causes of action because the bank followed
the contracts agreed to by the parties and the plaintiffs' reliance on
the alleged oral agreements was not reasonable.  Garrett v .
Bankwest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1990).
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BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES.  The plaintiffs were
creditors who sold feed, seed and fertilizer to the Chapter 11
debtor-in-possession during the bankruptcy case.  At the time the
case was converted to Chapter 7, the plaintiffs were owed $10,000
for the supplies.  The court held that although the supplies were
administrative expenses in the Chapter 11 case, the supplies were
treated as pre-petition dischargeable claims after conversion to
Chapter 7.  The plaintiffs also argued that under Section 506(c),
the cost of the supplies should be allowed as a claim against the
crops produced with the supplies.  The court held that Section
506(c) could only be asserted by the trustee or debtor in
possession and not by creditors.  As the court noted, the suppliers
of goods to the debtor-in-possession should have sought a security
interest to protect their claims in the event of a conversion to
Chapter 7.  In re Ramaker, 117 B.R. 959 (Bankr. N . D .
Iowa 1990).
EXEMPTIONS.  The court held that the debtors' shotguns,
rifles and a pistol were not exempt household goods under
Maryland Code § 11-504(b)(4).  The court also held that a VCR
was eligible for the household goods exemption and a lien against
the VCR could be avoided under Section 522(f), although the
debtors did not list the VCR as exempt.  In re  Barnes, 1 1 7
B.R. 842 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
The debtor owned an interest in a pension fund established by
an employer and which contained an anti-assignment clause.  The
court held that the pension fund was not a spendthrift trust and
was includible in the bankruptcy estate because the debtor could
receive a lump sum payment upon termination of employment.
The court also held that the exemption for pension funds, Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-1563.01 was not pre-empted by ERISA.  No
evidence was presented as to and the court did not rule on the issue
of whether the pension fund was necessary for the support of the
debtor, as required by the exemption provision.  Matter o f
Nuttleman, 117 B.R. 975 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990).
Two issues involving exemptions were certified to the
Supreme Court of Wyoming: whether a husband and wife may
each claim the $2,000 exemption of tools of the trade under Wyo.
Stat. § 1-20-106(b) when both are involved in the same farming
operation and whether a farmer or rancher may exempt under Wyo.
Stat. 1-15-408, 75 percent of the proceeds of livestock and crops
as personal earnings?  The court held that the tools of the trade
exemption was available to each person and not limited on a per
business basis; therefore, the debtors were each entitled to the
exemption.  The court also held that the proceeds from the sale of
livestock and crops are not earnings from personal services and
therefore not eligible for the 75 percent exemption.  Coones v .
F.D.I.C., 796 P.2d 803 (Wyo. 1990).
SALE OF ESTATE ASSETS.  The Chapter 11 trustee filed a
motion to sell, free and clear of liens, the debtor's stored cotton
which was collateral for a CCC loan.  Some of the redemption
periods for the cotton had ended prior to the bankruptcy filing,
some had ended post-petition and some had not yet passed.  The
court held that under the CCC regulations, once the redemption
period had lapsed, the CCC had to make an election to either take
title to the cotton or sell the cotton.  Therefore, because the CCC
had not taken any action pre-petition to take title to the cotton or
to sell the cotton, the right of redemption of the cotton was still
available to the debtor on the petition date and the right to redeem
the cotton was estate property.  The court also held that the
redemption period was tolled during the bankruptcy case.  The
court held that the CCC was a secured creditor as to the cotton and
that the trustee could sell the cotton if the proceeds would exceed
the amount due to the CCC for the cotton and other loan costs.  If
the proceeds would be less than the amount due, the trustee was to
abandon the cotton to the CCC.  The court found that the CCC
was adequately protected by this arrangement and because the value
of the cotton , if marketed properly, exceeded the amounts due on
the loans, the sale of the cotton by the trustee would provide the
maximum proceeds for the estate.  In re  Julien Co., 1 1 7
B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990).
  CHAPTER 12
AUTOMATIC STAY.  A plaintiff in a state case for specific
performance on a real estate contract against the Chapter 12
debtors moved for relief from the automatic stay so that the state
action could proceed.  The contract buyer alleged that the relief
should be granted because the contract was not executory or, even
if executory, cannot be rejected by the debtors.  The court denied
the relief from the stay because the issues could be decided more
economically in the bankruptcy court and the state action had not
proceeded past a decision on summary judgment.  In re
Collins, 118 B.R. 35 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990).
DISMISSAL.  The debtors' first Chapter 12 case was
dismissed in May 1988 for failure to confirm a plan.  A second
Chapter 12 petition was dismissed in May 1990 because of
unreasonable delay, continuing loss to the estate and absence of a
reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation.  The debtors filed a third
Chapter 12 petition in June 1990.  The debtors argued that their
reevaluation of the valuation of some collateral and their decision
to deed back to a creditor some collateral land were material
changes in their circumstances since the second dismissal.  The
court held that these changes were only changes in legal tactics
and were available to the debtors prior to the dismissal of their
second case; thus, the changes were insufficient to support the
allowance of the third petition.  In re  Fuhrman, 118 B . R .
72 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1990).
PLAN.  The Chapter 12 debtors operated a cattle ranch and had
granted a security interest in the cattle and ranch equipment as
security for a loan from a bank.  The Chapter 12 plan provided for
the sale of some of the cattle with the proceeds used to operate the
ranch and granted the bank a second mortgage in ranch real
property as a replacement lien on the cattle sold.  The debtors'
equity in the real property was sufficient to cover the first and
second liens against the property.  The bank objected to
confirmation of the plan and argued that Section 1225(a)(5)(B)(i)
required that the bank retain the lien in the cattle.  The court
agreed and reversed the confirmation of the plan.  However, the
court ruled that the bank's lien covers the entire herd of cattle and
not specific animals; therefore, so long as the value of the entire
herd is not diminished below an amount which would no longer
adequately protect the bank's claim, the plan may provide for the
sale of individual animals.  In re Hanna, 912 F.2d 945 (8th
Cir. 1990).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS FOR TAXES.  The
court held that the Chapter 11 debtor could allocate tax payments
made during the Chapter 11 case.  In re  T.M. Products C o . ,
118 B.R. 131 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990).
AUTOMATIC STAY.  The debtors filed a Chapter 11 petition
with their corporation and during that case the IRS assessed the
100 percent penalty against the debtors as responsible persons in
the corporation which failed to pay withholding taxes.  The
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debtors were later dismissed from the corporation's bankruptcy
case and filed their own individual Chapter 13 cases.  The debtors
argued that the IRS assessments during the Chapter 11 case were
void for violation of the automatic stay.  The court held that the
assessments were only voidable and were valid in the Chapter 13
case because the debtors failed to object to the assessments during
the Chapter 11 case.  In re Schwartz, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 50,533 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990).
CLAIMS.  The debtors were shareholders and officers of a
corporation also in bankruptcy.  The debtors listed in their debt
schedules a contingent claim for one dollar a claim by the IRS for
the 100 percent penalty for responsible persons in a corporation
which does not pay withholding taxes.  The IRS was provided
with notice of the debtors' bankruptcy case and the schedule of
debts but failed to file a claim for the 100 percent penalty until
after the bar date for such claims.  The IRS argued that the claim
should be allowed because it related to other claims for personal
income taxes owed by the debtors and because the debtors did not
inform the investigating officer of the debtors' Chapter 13 case.
The court held that the penalty claim did not relate to the personal
income tax claims because the claims did not arise out of the same
set of circumstances.  The court also held that because the IRS
knew about the Chapter 13 case and had determined the debtors'
penalty liability before the claims date but did not seek an
extension of time to file a claim, the IRS penalty claim would not
be allowed.  In re  Miller, 118 B.R. 76 (E.D. Tenn.
1989) .
TAX LIENS.  The IRS held valid tax liens against the
property of the debtors arising from the debtors' pre-petition
dischargeable tax liabilities.  The debtors argued that the tax liens
should be released under I.R.C. § 6325 because the underlying tax
obligations were unenforceable because dischargeable in
bankruptcy.  The court held that because the tax liens remained
enforceable against the property after the debtor's discharge in
bankruptcy, the IRS was not required by Section 6325 to release
the liens.  In re Dillard, 118 B.R. 89 (Bankr. N.D. I l l .
1990) .
COMMODITY FUTURES
CONTRACTS.  The CFTC has issued a notice of proposed
contract market rule change which amends the rough rice futures
contract locational price differentials for deliveries made at
warehouses not located at mill sites.  The amendments are
effective in September 1991.  55 Fed. Reg. 42753 (Oct.
23, 1990).
CONTRACTS
FORWARD CONTRACTS .  The plaintiff made an oral
contract with the defendant for the defendant to grow confection
sunflowers at a set price.  The defendant's son signed written
contracts memorializing the oral contracts.  The written contracts
identified the number of pounds of sunflowers to be delivered, the
price and a requirement that the defendant purchase the seeds from
the plaintiff.  During the growing season, the contract was
adjusted because of a severe infestation of weeds and drought.
However, the defendant did not deliver any sunflowers harvested
but sold most of the sunflowers to another party.  The plaintiff
covered the contract by purchasing sunflowers elsewhere at a price
higher than the contract price.  The plaintiff sued for the additional
amount paid for the sunflowers.  The defendant claimed that the
contract was for the production on a set amount of acres and not
for a set amount of pounds of sunflowers.  The court held that the
interpretation of the contract as for a set number of pounds was
consistent with the contract as a whole.  The defendant's failure to
perform was not excused because of the drought because the
defendant's total production exceeded the contracted amount of
sunflowers.  The court also held that although the defendant still
had some sunflowers which could be delivered to the plaintiff, the
plaintiff was justified in purchasing cover sunflowers upon
learning that the defendant had sold some sunflowers to other
parties because the sale substantially impaired the value of the
whole contract.  Red River Commodities, Inc. v .
Eidsness, 459 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1990).
ORAL CONTRACTS .  The plaintiffs applied for a loan
from the defendant bank of $150,000 but when the bank requested
a security interest in all of the plaintiffs' property, the plaintiffs
resubmitted an application for a $300,000 line of credit to support
the purchase of cattle.  Although a bank internal memorandum
indicated that the $300,000 line of credit had been approved, the
written loan agreement was for only $150,000.  When the bank
refused to lend any amounts above $150,000, the plaintiffs
suffered alleged financial losses.  The plaintiffs then sued for
breach of contract arguing that the bank failed to lend the
additional $150,000.  The bank defended by denying any
agreement to lend more than $150,000, by asserting the statute of
frauds because the contract was to be performed over more than
one year, and by asserting that no parol evidence was admissible
as to the written contract.  The trial court had agreed with the bank
and granted summary judgment for the bank.  The appellate court,
however, held that because the contract was capable, if even
remotely, of being performed within one year, the statute of frauds
did not apply.  The court also held that parol evidence was
admissible to prove the $300,000 line of credit because the written
agreement indicated that a $300,000 line of credit was intended and
supporting documents, such as the cash flow projections, indicated
the larger line of credit.  Delzer v. United Bank o f
Bismarck, 459 N.W.2d 752 (N.D. 1990).
The plaintiff entered into a timber sales agreement to cut
merchantable timber from one tract and marked timber on another
tract owned by the defendant.  The defendant alleged that the
plaintiff cut and removed more timber than allowed by the contract
and sued for conversion.  The court held that the plaintiff could
not present any parol evidence to increase the amount due under
the contract for the timber because the contract was clear and
unambiguous as to the consideration to be paid.  The court also
held that summary judgment for the defendant was improper
because the defendant failed to produce evidence that it had not cut
more than allowed under the contract; thus, an issue of fact
remained for the trier of fact to decide at trial.  Ward. v. Costal
Lumber Co., Inc., 395 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. Ct. App.
1990) .
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM
BORROWER'S RIGHTS.  After negotiations for
restructuring of the defendant's farm loans failed to produce an
agreement, the FCB sued to reduce the defendant's balance on the
loan to judgment.  The defendant argued that the FCB violated the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987 by failing to approve the
restructuring agreement where the cost of restructuring the loan
was less than the cost of foreclosure.  The court held that even if
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the defendants had a right of private action to enforce the Act's
provisions, the evidence demonstrated that the FCB had found that
the cost of restructuring exceeded the cost of foreclosure in
compliance with the Act.  Bangs v. Farm Credit Bank o f
Columbia, 396 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE.  The USDA has
adopted as final regulations governing the appearance of USDA
employees as witnesses in order to testify or produce official
documents in judicial or administrative proceedings.  55 Fed.
Reg. 42347 (Oct. 19, 1990).
BRUCELLOSIS.  The APHIS has announced an interim
rule adding North Carolina to the list of brucellosis-free states.
55 Fed. Reg. 41994 (Oct. 17, 1990).
The APHIS has announced an interim rule removing New
Jersey from the list of brucellosis-free states.  55 Fed. R e g .
42353 (Oct. 19, 1990).
HOUSING LOANS.  The FmHA has announced proposed
regulations amending the administration of the Rural Housing
loan program. The proposed regulations contain specific examples
of what credit problems of borrowers will be considered
unacceptable and under what circumstances poor credit may not be
held against an applicant.  55 Fed. Reg. 42576 (Oct. 2 2 ,
1990) .
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT .  The debtor purchased produce from several creditors who
were unpaid and who filed timely and sufficient notices of intent
to preserve their rights in the PACA trust fund assets of the
debtor.  During the operation of the debtor's business, the debtor's
principal had received a $40,000 donation from a parent which was
used in the business and for the purchase of a truck and other
equipment.  The debtor's principal also transferred a small truck to
the debtor.  The court ruled that all assets of the debtor were
considered part of the PACA trust assets unless proven by the
debtor not to be proceeds from the sale of produce.  The court held
that because the debtor was unable to prove that the $40,000 was
kept in a separate fund and the truck and equipment was purchased
from this fund, the $40,000 was considered commingled with
PACA trust assets and the truck and equipment were trust assets.
The small truck was not included in PACA trust assets because it
was transferred in kind to the debtor.  In re  Atlantic Tropical
Market Corp., 118 B.R. 139 (Bankr. S.D. F la .
1990) .
PRODUCTION ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS .  The
plaintiffs were partners in a farming partnership which had applied
for participation in the 1986 wheat program.  The partnership
entered into a lease to farm land owned by a corporation and two
of the partners individually, with the lease contingent upon the
partnership being accepted into the wheat program.  The
partnership was formed with a small amount of capital and had
applied for a farm operating loan from a bank which was approved
contingent upon the partnership being accepted into the wheat
program and receiving payments as a separate "person" for
purposes of the $50,000 payment limitation.  Although interim
approval of the partnership application into the wheat program
was granted, but without telling the partnership, the application
was ultimately denied on the basis of failure to demonstrate that
the partnership had an ownership interest in a farming operation.
The partnership argued that the interim approval showed that the
final decision was arbitrary and capricious.  The court held that
inconsistency in the approval process did not affect the priority of
the ultimate decision so long as the ultimate decision was
supported by the evidence before the agency.The court rejected the
partnership's claim of equitable estoppel based on the interim
approval because equitable estoppel is not allowed against a
government agency and the partnership did not rely on the interim
approval.  The court also rejected the partnership's express and
implied contract claims.  Stevens v. U.S., 21 Cl. Ct. 1 9 5
(1990) .
The plaintiffs had applied to the county ASCS committee for
reconstitution of their farm acreage bases for wheat, cotton and
corn.  The committee ruled that the historical method should be
used.  After administrative appeal, the plaintiff succeeded in
having the committee's decision reversed in favor of using the
cropland method.  The plaintiff then brought an action under the
Federal Tort Claims Act for damages suffered during the
administrative appeal process from the inability to use the
cropland method of determining the crop acreage bases.  The court
held that because the ASCS county committee exercise judgment
in determining which method to use, the decision of the
committee was discretionary and not subject to the FTCA under




BASIS OF ESTATE PROPERTY.  The decedent
bequeathed stock to the surviving spouse in a marital trust over
which the spouse had a general power of appointment.  The
surviving spouse died several years later but before the stock was
actually transferred to the marital trust.  Instead, the corporation
was liquidated with realization of substantial gain and the marital
trust received its share of the proceeds.  The amount of property
included in the surviving spouse's estate included the appreciation
realized in the sale of the corporation assets.  The executor of the
decedent's estate then claimed a refund based on a stepped-up basis
in the property passing to the marital trust equal to the value of
the stock proceeds included in the surviving spouse's estate.  The
court held that the decedent's estate was not entitled to an increase
in value of the marital trust property because, under Section 1014,
a step-up in basis is allowed only for property received from a
decedent; therefore, because the decedent did not receive the
property from the surviving spouse, no step-up in basis is
allowed.  Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. U.S., 90-2 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,526 (D. Conn. 1990).
DISCLAIMERS.  The decedent had established an IRA
account and at the time of death was receiving payments under an
election to receive payments over the life expectancies of the
decedent and the decedent's spouse.  The decedent's spouse was
named as a beneficiary and as a beneficiary of a trust which was a
contingent beneficiary of the IRA.  The other beneficiary of the
trust was the spouse's child.  The IRS ruled that the surviving
spouse's disclaimer of an interest in the IRA and the trust was a
qualified disclaimer.  Ltr. Rul. 90037048, June 20, 1990.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS .  A trust
was established in 1955 by the will of the parent of the trust
beneficiaries.  The beneficiaries have a testamentary power to
appoint each beneficiary's share of the trust to their children.  The
beneficiaries proposed to execute wills which exercise that power
of appointment to their children with a provision that if the
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beneficiary's child predeceases the beneficiary, the grandchildren of
the beneficiary will receive the interest in the trust.  The IRS ruled
that the exercise of the power of appointment does not modify the
original 1955 trust so as to subject the trust to GSTT.  In
addition, the passing of the trust interests to the beneficiaries'
grandchildren, if the beneficiaries' children predecease them, will
not be direct skips subject to GSTT.  Ltr. Rul. 9040046 ,
July 10, 1990.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  Under the decedent's will, the
residuary property passed to marital and family trusts.  The marital
trust was to receive as much property as would obtain the
"optimum marital deduction," defined in the will as the amount
which would equalize the decedent's and surviving spouse's estate
to produce the lowest possible estate taxes or the greater of 50
percent of the decedent's estate or $250,000.  The IRS argued that
the marital deduction was limited to the amount of property
passing to the surviving spouse outside of the trust because the
amount of such property exceeded one-half of the decedent's gross
estate.  The court agreed with the IRS, holding that the definition
of optimum marital deduction was limited by the will's own
definition to one-half of the decedent's gross estate; therefore, the
residuary marital trust was not eligible for the marital deduction.
Est. of Klein v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1990-527.
Under the decedent's will the surviving spouse had the right to
occupy the principal residence but if the surviving spouse vacates
the house prior to death, the house was to be sold with one-half of
the proceeds to go to the decedent's son and one-half to a QTIP
trust for the surviving spouse.  The IRS ruled that one-half of the
residence was QTIP.  Ltr. Rul. 9040001, June 8, 1990.
Under the decedent's will the surviving spouse received a life
interest in a trust in which the trustee was authorized to sell trust
assets.  Under Calif. Prob. Code § 16040 the trustee is required to
manage trust property to generate an acceptable rate of return on
the trust assets.  The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse's interest
in the trust was eligible QTIP.  Ltr. Rul 9040016, July 3 ,
1990 .
The decedent and the surviving spouse had entered into a
prenuptial agreement which was to provide the surviving spouse
with a life time interest in a condominium and two trusts;
however, the decedent did not execute the necessary documents to
establish the trusts.  In a settlement with the estate, the spouse
was to receive a life time interest in the condominium and two
trusts similar to the provisions of the prenuptial agreement.  The
IRS held that the surviving spouse received the interests under a
bona fide settlement of the spouse's rights and the interest passed
from the decedent to the surviving spouse and were eligible QTIP.
Ltr. Rul. 9040032, July 6, 1990.
The decedent's will bequeathed property in trust to the
surviving spouse with a remainder to the decedent's son.  The
trustee, the surviving spouse, had the discretion to accumulate
trust income or to distribute the income.  The court held that the
surviving spouse's interest in the trust did not qualify as QTIP.
Est. of Doherty v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. No. 32 (1990).
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The estate elected to
value farm and ranch land at the special use value but did not
include appraisals of the land with the estate tax return.  The court
held that the special use valuation election was ineffective because
of the failure to file the appraisal and that the election could not be
perfected.  Est. of Doherty v. Comm'r, 95 T.C. No. 3 2
(1990) .
    TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH.  The decedent had established a revocable trust with the
decedent as sole beneficiary and with the decedent retaining
unrestricted right to amend any aspect of the trust.  Within a
month of death, the decedent directed the trustees to transfer stock
worth about $10,000 to each of 20 persons.  The trustees had not
transferred the stock by the decedent's death but did so in a
document back dated to before the decedent's death.  The court held
that the transferred stock was includible, under Section 2038, in
the decedent's estate because at the time of the transfer the decedent
held a power to amend or revoke the trust; therefore, under Section
2035, the transfer of the stock within three years of the decedent's
death included the stock in the gross estate.  Perkins v. U . S . ,




ACCOUNTING METHOD.  The IRS has announced that
for purposes of the economic performance requirement of I.R.C. §
461(h), the IRS will not challenge positions previously taken that
relied on published rulings relating to the accrual of property taxes
for the taxable years beginning before January 1, 1990.  For
taxable years after that date, the proposed regulations issued on
June 7, 1990 will apply.  See p. 132 supra.  Notice 90 -64 ,
I.R.B. 1990-44, 13.
COMMODITY FUTURES .  The taxpayer made several
trades in commodity futures over two years and claimed ordinary
loss deductions for losses from the trades.  The IRS moved for
summary judgment on its claim that because a majority of the
trades were speculative, all of the trades were speculative and
subject to capital loss treatment.  The court rejected this argument
and held that the character of each trade determines the type of loss
deduction allowed for each trade.  The court held that summary
judgment was not proper because material issues of fact remained
as to the character of the trades involved.  In re  Blazek, 90 -2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,528 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1990) .
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS.  The settlement
of the taxpayer's gambling debt in excess of $3 million for
$500,000 was not discharge of indebtedness income because the
gambling debt was unenforceable and the taxpayer held no
property subject to the debt.  Zarin v. Comm'r, 90-2 U . S .
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,530 (3rd Cir. 1990), rev'g , 9 2
T.C. 1084 (1989).
FORMS .  The IRS has announced that Forms W-2c,
Statement of Corrected Income and Tax Amounts, and W-3c,
Transmittal of Corrected Income and Tax Statements, have been
revised.  The new forms may be ordered by calling 1-800-829-
3676.  Ann. 90-116, I.R.B. 1990-42, 31.
HOBBY LOSSES.  The taxpayers were not allowed losses
in excess of gross income from a horse breeding activity because
of lack of profits, inconsistent success with horse breedings, and
substantial losses.  Harston v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo.
1990-538 .
INTEREST.  The taxpayer corporation established unfunded,
nonqualified deferred compensation arrangements for key
executives which provided for payments upon termination of
employment.  The accounts for each employee reflected the
deferred compensation amount plus interest.  The court held that
the interest listed in each account was not deductible by the
taxpayer except in the years the interest was actually paid to a
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retired employee.  Albertson's Inc. v. Comm'r, 95 T . C .
No. 30 (1990).
The taxpayer purchased life insurance on the taxpayer's life and
paid a portion of the first premium by borrowing against the
future cash value of the insurance.  During the three years of the
policy's existence, part of the annual premium and interest on the
loan was paid by borrowing against the increase in the value of
the policy.  The court held that the interest was deductible by the
taxpayer because the taxpayer had not paid the interest by
borrowing against the policy for more than three years and the
policy was not paid for by a single premium.  Shirar v .
Comm'r, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,540 (9th
Cir. 1990), rev'g , T.C. Memo. 1987-192.
INVESTMENT INTEREST.  In 1981 the taxpayers had
investment interest deductions which were disallowed because the
interest exceeded investment income.  The amount of disallowed
interest was carried over to 1982 and further carried over to 1983.
The Tax Court agreed with the IRS that the amount allowed to be
carried over to 1983 was limited by the amount of total taxable
income in 1982.  The appellate court reversed and held that the
total amount of investment interest disallowed in each taxable
year, including any carryover amount, could be carried over to the
following year.  Beyer v. Comm'r, 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 50,536 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'g , 92 T . C .
1304 (1989).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.  The shareholders of an
S corporation owning investment tax credit property was not
required to recapture investment tax credit when the S corporation
merged with a C corporation in a tax-free reorganization under
Section 381(a), because the merger was a mere change in the form
of doing business where the merged corporation carried on the
same business with the same assets.  Giovanini v. U.S., 9 0 -
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,542 (D. Ore. 1990).
  PARTNERSHIPS  
TAX SHELTERS.  The taxpayer offered interests in a tax
shelter but placed all funds received for subscriptions in an escrow
account until a minimum number of subscriptions were obtained.
If the minimum number was not obtained, the funds, plus
interest, were to be returned to the subscribers.  IRS ruled that the
taxpayer was not required to provide the subscribers with the tax
shelter registration number until the minimum number of
subscribers was obtained and the invested funds were not
returnable.  Rev. Rul. 90-84, I.R.B. 1990-42, 4.
The taxpayer intended to sell limited partnership interests in a
sale exempt from registration under I.R.C. § 6111(c)(1)(B)(ii).
The private placement memorandum (PPM) indicates that the
deductions and credits allocable to each investor will be more than
double of the investment in the partnership interests.  However,
the PPM also indicates that the passive income limitations of
Section 469 may apply.  The IRS ruled that all of the deductions
and credits available to investors must be taken into account in
calculating the investors tax shelter ratio because the investors
may have other passive investment income to decrease the effect
of the Section 469 limitation.  Rev. Rul. 90-85, I .R.B.
1990-42, 5.
A limited partnership purchased an interest in another
partnership.  The limited partnership then offered for sale interests
in the limited partnership.  The IRS ruled that the numerator of
the tax shelter ratio for each investor in the limited partnership
included that investor's share of the gross deductions from the
limited partnership and the partnership interest acquired by the
limited partnership.  Rev. Rul. 90-86, I.R.B. 1990-42, 6.
RETIREMENT PLANS . The IRS has issued temporary
regulations providing rules for the treatment of plans that are
being or have been terminated pursuant to Sections 4041(c) or
4042 of ERISA and are restored to the sponsoring employers.  5 5
Fed. Reg. 42704 (Oct. 23, 1990), adding Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.412(c)(1)-3T.
  S CORPORATIONS  
ALLOCATION OF INTEREST EXPENSE.  The shareholders
of three corporations transferred their shares to a trust which sold
the stock to two individuals who paid cash and a note for the stock
and pledged the stock as security for the note.  The trustee retained
the right to vote the stock but the buyer received dividends,
interest and distributions.  The three corporations elected S
corporation status and were merged into one S corporation with
the buyer retaining their percentage interest in the combined
corporation.  The IRS ruled that the merger alone did not
terminate the resulting corporation's S corporation status and the
pledge of the stock did not create a second class of stock.  The IRS
also ruled that the debt and associated interest incurred by the
buyers to purchase the stock are to be reallocated on the effective
date of the corporations' election for S corporation status,
according to the allocation rules of Section IV.A of Notice 89-35,
1989-1 C.B. 675.  Ltr. Rul. 9040066, July 12, 1990.
BUILT-IN GAINS.  The corporation filed an S corporation
election on December 24, 1986, with an effective date of January
1, 1987, but the election was returned because of an invalid
effective date.  The election was amended to be effective on May
1, 1987.  The IRS ruled that even though the effective date was
incorrect, the election would be considered filed before January 1,
1987, and the corporation would not be subject to the built-in
gains rule of Section 1374.  Ltr. Rul. 9040040, July 9 ,
1990 .
SECOND CLASS OF STOCK.  The shareholders of an S
corporation were required to sell their stock upon termination of
employment, except during retirement, or death at a price
determined under the shareholders' agreement.  The shareholders'
agreement was amended to change the formula for determining the
price of shares required to be sold.  The IRS ruled that because the
amendment did not affect the shareholders' rights in the
corporation's profits and assets, the agreement as amended did not
create a second class of stock.  Ltr. Rul. 9040012, July 9 ,
1990 .
TRUSTS.  A testamentary trust which owned S corporation
stock included a spendthrift clause which had the potential to
distribute trust income to the sole beneficiary and/or the
beneficiary's descendants.  The trustees and beneficiary obtained a
court order removing the spendthrift clause.  The IRS held that the
trust was a qualified Subchapter S trust after modification by the
court order, but did not rule as to the qualification of the trust
prior to removal of the clause.  Ltr. Rul. 9040020, July 5 ,
1990 .
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
NOVEMBER 1990
    Annual                                                                                                                                                                                                        Semi-annual                                Quarterly                         Monthly    
Short-term
         AFR  8.04 7.88 7.80 7.75
110% AFR  8.86 8.67 8.58 8.52
120% AFR 9.68  9.46 9.35 9.26
Mid-term
         AFR  8.78  8.60 8.51 8.45
110% AFR 9.68 9.46 9.35 9.28
120% AFR 10.69 10.32 10.19 10.10
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Long-term
         AFR  9.13 8.93 8.83 8.77
110% AFR 10.06 9.82 9.70 9.62
120% AFR 11.01  10.72 10.58 10.49
SALE OF RESIDENCE.  The taxpayer sold an interest in
real property which was partially used for a produce stand business
and partially used as a residence.  After sale of the taxpayer's
interest in the property, the taxpayer purchased another residence.
The court, in Poague v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,448 (E.D. Va. 1990) see p. 175 supra, held that the gain from
the sale of the interest in the old property was deferrable to the
extend the property was used as a residence.  In the present case,
the court allocated the property first as to the percentage of the
building space used as a residence and then allocated the remaining
property according to the ratio of business space to residential
space in the buildings.  Poague v. U.S., 90-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) § 50,539 (E.D. Va. 1990).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
DAMAGES.  The plaintiff leased orchards which were
damaged by the drifting of herbicide aerially applied by the
defendant to a neighbor's wheat crop.  The court held that the
plaintiff could not recover damages for the lost production of the
orchards for the time after the expiration of the lease in effect on
the date of the injury to the orchard, even though the plaintiff
renewed the lease under an option to renew.  Burnette v .
Morgan, 794 S.W.2d 145 (Ark. 1990).
SALE OF LEASED LAND.  The plaintiff had purchased
the farm in a foreclosure of a first mortgage held by the plaintiff.
The second mortgage holder also began foreclosure proceedings
against the farm and a receiver was appointed in that case.  The
receiver leased the farm to a corporation which subleased the farm
to the defendant.  The plaintiff then brought an action for
ejectment of the defendant who counterclaimed for damages
resulting from inability to participate in federal farm programs
because of interference by the plaintiff.  The court held that the
failure of the plaintiff to serve to the defendant notice of
termination of the lease resulted in no termination of the lease
even though the sublessor had received notice.  The court also
upheld the jury verdict that the plaintiff interfered with the
contractual relations of the defendant in asserting to the ASCS
that the plaintiff was the owner of the land and would be applying
for the federal farm programs.  Kansas City Life Ins. C o .
v. Hullinger, 459 N.W.2d 889 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
MORTGAGES
VALIDITY.  The debtors had granted a bank a mortgage on
the debtors' farm as security for two letters of credit totaling
$280,000.  The mortgage stated, however, that it secured a note
for $200,000 and that upon satisfaction of the note, full title to
the land would revert to the debtors and the bank would issue a
release.  The debtors did not make any withdrawals on the letters
of credit and the letters expired prior to the debtor filing for
bankruptcy but the bank did not issue any release.  The debtors
orally agreed to have the mortgage secure other obligations to the
bank and several months later put those agreements in writing.
The creditor committee and trustee sought to avoid the mortgage
as unperfected because the mortgage expired when the letters of
credit expired and the mortgage was not recorded as to the other
obligations which it secured.  The bank argued that the recording
of the mortgage for the letters of credit was sufficient constructive
notice of a security interest securing the later obligations.  The
court held that the expiration of the letters of credit terminated the
mortgage and that any subsequent mortgage securing later
obligations would be required to meet the formalities of Wis. Stat.
§ 706.02 which required mortgages to be in writing.  Thus, the
trustee, as a bona fide purchaser under Section 544(a)(3), could
avoid the mortgage lien.  In re Carley Capital Group, 1 1 7
B.R. 951 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1990).
NEGLIGENCE
GUY WIRE.  The plaintiff was injured when the plaintiff's
horse struck a guy wire supporting one of the defendant's electrical
poles on a neighbor's property.  The plaintiff was chasing a stray
calf at the time of the accident.  The court held that the plaintiff
was a licensee on the neighbor's property and the property owners
did not owe the plaintiff the duty of ordinary care.  Because the
defendant held only an easement for the electrical pole and guy
wire, the defendant could not assert the same standard of care as the
property owners.  Therefore, summary judgment for the defendant
was reversed because an issue of fact remained as to whether the
defendant exercise ordinary care in not providing sufficient warning
signs on the guy wire.  Musch v. H-D Elec. Coop., Inc. ,
460 N.W.2d 149 (S.D. 1990).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
CULTIVATOR.  The plaintiff's decedent was killed as a
result of an accident involving the collision of a truck driven by
the decedent and a cultivator manufactured by the defendant and
pulled by a farmer on a highway overpass.  The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer in strict liability alleging that the cultivator was
unreasonably dangerous because it lacked sufficient warning
devices and the cultivator extended over the mid-point of the
highway.  The trial court granted summary judgment for the
manufacturer and the appellate court agreed.  The court held that
the cultivator had warning reflectors on the portion extending over
the highway and the tractor had its warning lights in operation.  In
addition, the plaintiff failed to present any evidence of alternative
warning devices which would have prevented the accident.  The
court also held that the cultivator was not unreasonably dangerous
due to its length, because (1) the owner had altered the design by
attaching a harrow which prevented the complete folding of the
cultivator's arms for transport, (2) the plaintiff had not presented
any evidence of the feasibility of narrower designs of the
cultivator, and (3) the state highway requirements for the widths of
vehicles contained an exemption for farm husbandry equipment.
Because the extension of the cultivator into the oncoming lane of
traffic was an obvious danger, the width of the cultivator provided
only a condition by which injury could be caused through the
subsequent act of a person.  West v. Deere & Co., 5 5 9
N.E.2d 511 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRODUCER'S LIEN.  The Chapter 11 debtor was a fruit
and vegetable processor which had purchased produce from
growers.  Some of the growers signed contracts which governed
the sale of the produce to the debtor and which contained clauses
releasing the growers' producer's lien.  One grower signed the
contract but crossed out the release portion.  One grower
association signed the contract but the contract provided for a
security interest in the produce if the debtor failed to make
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payment.  The growers asserted their producer's lien, Cal. Food &
Agric. Code §§ 55631-55653, against the debtor's bankruptcy
estate property.  The trial court entered judgment for the debtor,
holding that because each grower had entered into a contract which
provided payment terms, the growers had automatically released
their liens according to Cal. Food & Agric. Code § 55637.  The
appellate court reversed, holding that the release of the lien is
discretionary with the grower after payment arrangements are
made.  The issue of whether the release clauses in the contracts
were effective was not decided.  In re  T.H. Richards
Processing Co., 910 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1990).
ZONING
PROPANE TANK.  The defendant constructed a liquid
propane tank on land zoned agricultural and leased the tank to a
farm cooperative association located next to the tank.  The court
held that the leasing of the tank was not an agricultural operation
and violated the zoning ordinance.  Farmington Township v .
High Plains Coop., 460 N.W.2d 56 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990) .
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